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Abstract
We consider the implications of ethical behaviour on the effect of a redistributive tax-transfer 
system. In choosing their labour supplies, individuals take into account whether their tax 
liabilities correspond to what they view as ethically acceptable. If tax liabilities are viewed as 
ethically acceptable, a taxpayer behaves ethically, does not distort her behaviour, and chooses 
to work as if she were not taxed. On the other hand, if ethical behaviour results in tax 
liabilities that exceed those that are ethically acceptable, she behaves egoistically (partially or 
fully), distorts her behaviour, and chooses her labour supply taking into account the income 
tax. We establish taxpayers’ equilibrium behaviour and obtain that labour supply is less 
elastic when taxpayers may behave ethically than when they act egoistically. We characterise 
and compare the egoistic voting equilibrium linear tax schedules under potentially ethical 
and egoistic behaviour. We also compare our results to those obtained under altruism, an 
alternative benchmark.
Keywords: Ethical behaviour; Kantian preferences; income taxation; redistribution
I. Introduction
It is apparent that in many social and economic situations, individuals do
not behave as a selfish homo oeconomicus would behave. On the contrary,
many studies suggest that individuals exhibit concern for others in their
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2behaviour. Rabin (1998) highlights many examples, both inside and out-
side of laboratories, where people demonstrate behaviour that departs from 
pure self-interest. Experimental evidence includes Andreoni (1995), who 
finds that individuals avoid free-riding in public good provision games, 
and Camerer and Thaler (1995), who discover non-selfish behaviour in 
ultimatum and dictator games. Non-experimental evidence of benevolent 
behaviour includes the cases of tipping studied by Lynn and Grassman 
(1990) and charitable donations discussed by Bilodeau and Slivinski (1997) 
or Andreoni (1998). Fong (2001) reports evidence from surveys that people 
do indeed care about non-related individuals in society. We also observe 
concerns about fairness and reciprocity in the determination of prices or 
wages, as in Blinder and Choi (1990). Fehr and Ga¨chter (2000) survey a 
variety of situations where such phenomena can be observed. For example, 
interpreting wage determination as a gift exchange, whereby firms offer 
wages and workers respond with labour, can help explain why more prof-
itable firms pay higher wages. Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986) find 
that consumers who regard a monopoly price as unfair may refuse to buy 
a product even if buying it would benefit them.
Given that individuals display benevolent behaviour in some dimensions 
of their economic life, could it be that they also display such behaviour 
when paying taxes? In this context, it is useful to distinguish tax evasion 
from tax avoidance; see Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002). Tax evasion involves 
illegal behaviour, such as under-reporting income to the tax authorities, 
while tax avoidance involves reducing one’s tax liabilities by entirely legal 
means, such as tax planning or simply substituting non-taxable activity 
(leisure, household production, consumption of untaxed goods) for taxable 
activity (earning income, consuming taxable goods).
According to Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein (1998), the answer to the 
question posed above is affirmative in the case of tax evasion. They high-
light the fact that tax compliance around the world is surprisingly high 
given the low probabilities of audit and the size of the sanctions.1 There 
are various potential explanations for this. Erard and Feinstein (1994) have 
suggested that it is the shame of getting caught. Others, like Gordon (1989), 
argue that tax evasion is influenced by a social norm, whereby individuals 
experience a psychic cost of tax evasion which depends on the level of 
tax evasion in the general population. Bordignon (1993) turns to fairness 
and ethical considerations as a way to endogenise the norm. Following an 
approach similar to Laffont (1975), he develops a model in which indi-
viduals display what he calls Kantian preferences. It involves a two-step
1 For example, in 1988 almost 70% of U.S. households chose not to evade taxes. Yet, the
audit rate over that period was only 0.8%, and typically the penalties applied were of the
order of only 20% of the unpaid taxes.
3process. First, individuals determine what would be a fair amount of taxes
to pay to finance public goods based on their income relative to the aver-
age and what they think the average person should pay. Then, in a second
stage, they choose how much to evade. If their tax liability is no more
than what they believe is fair, they will choose not to evade. Otherwise,
they will evade, and the extent of their evasion will depend upon the dif-
ference between their actual tax liability and their fair one.2 There is some
evidence to support such behaviour. Spicer and Becker (1980) use an ex-
perimental approach to show that individuals who feel they are victims of
fiscal inequality evade taxes more.
The intent of this paper is to extend the notion of ethical behaviour to
the case of tax avoidance. In particular, we study the extent to which house-
holds may choose not to change their labour supply (thereby not avoiding
taxes) when faced with distortionary taxation if they have ethical views on
the amount of redistribution to be financed by labour income taxes. Ethical
preferences and behaviour have been used as an argument for condition-
ing individual decisions influencing the provision of a public good, either
directly through voluntary provision or indirectly through their decision to
comply with the tax system by choosing not to evade taxes. We deploy ethi-
cal behaviour to address the issue of redistribution in an environment where
taxes are distortionary so individuals can avoid paying taxes (legally) by
changing their labour supply. Tax avoidance is qualitatively different from
tax evasion in an important dimension: it does not involve illegal behaviour.
Since there is no legal sanction against tax avoidance, it might be thought
that it is correspondingly more difficult to make the case that individuals
will not engage in it, especially since it apparently goes against their own
self-interest.3 Nonetheless, since we observe non-selfish behaviour in other
social and economic situations where legal sanctions are not required for
enforcement, one might also expect non-selfish tax-paying behaviour given
that paying taxes has explicit social consequences.
2 Bordignon builds on an earlier paper of his in which he uses a similar procedure to justify
the absence of free-riding in public good contributions; see Bordignon (1990). More recently,
Bilodeau and Gravel (2004) generalised such an approach for a wide variety of games with
public goods. In a related approach, Sugden (1984) develops a model of reciprocity in which
households choose not to free-ride in their voluntary public goods contributions as long as
those in their community do, but deviate otherwise.
3 In this context, it is interesting to note the argument of Musgrave (1992) that the deadweight
loss of redistributive taxation (tax avoidance) should not count (have “standing”) from the
point of view of normative tax analysis, unlike in standard optimal tax theory. That is, tax
avoidance—like free-riding—is somehow unethical so should not be rewarded. While legal
sanctions are not imposed on those providing a low level of labour supply, it is quite possible
for society to stigmatise those who work less, thereby making that choice less attractive. On
such social norms and sanctions, see Besley and Coate (1992), Lindbeck, Nyberg and Weibull
(1999) or, more related to our analysis, Cervellati, Esteban and Kranich (2004).
4The approach we use bears some formal similarity to Bordignon (1993), 
but it differs in three key respects. First, our analysis involves the decision 
to avoid taxes rather than to evade them. Next, our analysis is concerned 
with using taxes for redistribution rather than for public goods. Finally, we 
suppose that households use a social welfare function to calculate their fair 
tax burdens. As in Bordignon, ethical behaviour enters into individuals’ 
decisions in a two-step process. In the first step, individuals determine 
what they regard as their fair, or ethical, tax liabilities (or the transfers 
they should receive depending on their income level). In the second step, 
they compare the net tax liability that they would incur under the existing 
tax system if they behaved in a non-distortionary manner with the amount 
they regard as fair according to the first-stage ethical calculation. If this 
tax liability exceeds their ethical one, they deviate from non-distortionary 
behaviour by supplying less labour to reduce their tax liability. The precise 
amount by which they reduce their labour supply is discussed in detail 
in the following section. The ethical tax liability is calculated by solving 
a social welfare-maximising problem for the economy as a whole, which 
yields both an ethical tax system and a set of ethical labour supplies for 
all households.
As in Bordignon (1990) and Bilodeau and Gravel (2004), this procedure 
fits nicely with the Kantian principle (or Golden Rule): “Do unto others 
as you would have them do unto you”. Bilodeau and Gravel highlight two 
important conditions for an ethical rule to be consistent with this Kantian 
principle. The first is the principle of anonymity, which is satisfied by the 
social welfare function that we choose. The second is that the rule must 
yield the most preferred outcome to all individuals, when all individuals 
follow that rule. For example, in a simple, contributing or not, symmet-
ric, public good game, “all contributing” or “none contributing” are two 
rules that satisfy anonymity, but only “all individuals contributing” satis-
fies the second rule. In our context, matters are complicated because of 
the redistributive aspect of our game. We assume that all individuals use 
the same social welfare function for ethical purposes, and this guarantees 
satisfaction of the second condition. An important aspect of such a process 
is that, if there were enough tax instruments, the outcomes of all individ-
uals’ ethical calculation would not only be identical, but they would also 
be first best. Then, the ethical labour supply of every individual would be 
the undistorted labour supply that would apply if taxes had been lump-sum 
redistributive taxes. To simplify matters, we assume that the tax system is 
a linear progressive income tax. With this two-parameter tax system, this 
first-best ethical outcome will occur if individuals are of two wage types, 
and we take advantage of that simplification in what follows.
To emphasise the main features of our analysis, we adopt a form of 
household preferences—quasi-linear in consumption and additive—such
5that there are no income effects on labour supply: labour supply depends
only on the net wage rate. One of the most striking differences we find
under ethical behaviour compared to behaviour originating from standard
preferences is that labour supplies are much less elastic with respect to
changes in the tax rate in general, and in some cases can be perfectly
inelastic. For example, if the tax rate is relatively low, high-wage agents
end up paying fewer taxes than they believe is fair. Consequently, they
choose their labour supply as if the tax were lump-sum. In the absence of
income effects, a change in the tax rate will not change the situation, as
long as the net tax they have to pay (the tax on their income less the lump-
sum transfer) is no greater that what they believe to be fair. The equivalent
applies for low-wage agents when tax rates are high. In the many studies
on labour supply elasticity, it is typically found that those elasticities are
relatively small or even close to zero, the traditional argument being that
income and substitution effects cancel each other out.4 In our paper, we
abstract from income effect. Low elasticities will come instead from fair-
ness considerations. Overall, our model generates labour supplies that are
higher and less responsive to the after-tax wage rate than those a model
with purely selfish individuals would generate, especially for extreme tax
rates, either high or low.
Once we have described individual behaviour, we can consider the effect
of the tax rate on equilibrium outcomes. We study what happens to labour
supply and welfare when the tax rate deviates from the fair one, and com-
pare this with the case of selfish behaviour. It is then natural to consider
voting over the tax schedule in such a context. When individuals vote using
as their preferences the ethical social welfare function benchmark (“fully
ethical voting”), the voting problem is also trivial since all will vote for the
fair tax rate. However, we argue that even though individuals may behave
ethically given the tax system, they might reasonably vote at least partly
according to self-interest. We analyse the consequences of this for equilib-
rium outcomes assuming that the median voter is a low-wage individual.
Contrary to our first intuition, we find that the tax rate chosen by low-
wage egoistic voters could actually be lower when workers may potentially
behave ethically than when they behave egoistically. Intuitively, because
labour elasticities are lower under ethical behaviour, higher tax rates might
reasonably be chosen since they are less distortionary. However, low-wage
individuals, anticipating that they will behave ethically under high tax rates,
may prefer a lower tax rate as a way to protect themselves from such ethical
behaviour.
4 For a discussion of different studies on labour elasticity and taxation, see Blundell (1992).
More closely related to taxes, Arrufat and Zabalza (1986) pointed out the relatively low
concentration of income at tax kinks, suggesting that agents are not very responsive to taxes.
6Finally, we compare our approach with a competing alternative where 
agents are simply altruistic, and regard providing higher labour supply as 
a way to increase the welfare of others. Under such an assumption, agents 
will adjust their labour supply so that they compensate for the imperfections 
of the tax system. For example, if taxes are too low, high-wage agents will 
choose to work more than the efficient amount and low-wage agents will 
choose to work less. This is reminiscent of the neutrality result in Bernheim 
and Bagwell (1988), except that neutrality in our context is not a conse-
quence of undoing the distortionary tax system, but rather a consequence 
of undoing levels of redistribution that are judged to be inadequate.
II. The Model
There are n taxpayers whose common preferences are represented by a 
quasi-linear additive utility function u(c, ) = c − h(), where c is consump-
tion,  is labour, and h′() > 0 and h′′() > 0. Taxpayers are indexed by 
i ∈ {1, . . .  , n} and differ only in their wage rate w i. A taxpayer of type i 
working  hours earns an income w i which is taxed by a linear income tax 
with a proportional tax rate t and a demogrant e. Consumption is therefore 
given by c = (1 − t)w i  + e and utility by u = (1 − t)w i  + e − h().
We assume that when a taxpayer faces tax liabilities that correspond 
to what she views as fair, she behaves ethically. She does not distort her 
behaviour to avoid taxes, and chooses to work as if she were not taxed 
(as if t = 0). On the other hand, if she faces tax liabilities that she views 
as unreasonable, she behaves egoistically ( partially or fully), distorts her 
behaviour to reduce her tax payment, and chooses her labour supply taking 
into account the linear income tax schedule (with t > 0). Our assumption 
of quasi-linear additive preferences serves to make this distinction precise 
because labour supply in this case depends only upon the after-tax wage 
rate, or equivalently, the marginal tax rate given the household’s wage rate.
Let i (t) be the fully egoistic labour supply of taxpayer i given tax 
schedule (t, e). It is given by:
i (t) = arg max

(1 − t)wi + e − h(). (1)
Thus, i (t) solves the first-order condition (1 − t)wi = h′(i ), where ′i (t) =−wi/h′′(i ) < 0. This implies that i (t) increases with the wage rate:
i (t) >  j (t) for w i > w j .
Now let ¯i be what we call the ethical labour supply of taxpayer i, given
by:
¯i = arg max

wi − h(). (2)
7An ethical taxpayer ignores the tax schedule (t, e) in her choice of labour
supply, and ¯i solves the first-order condition wi = h′(¯i ). Again note that
¯i is increasing in the wage rate.
Taxpayer i’s ethical behaviour depends upon her perception of ethical
outcomes for the economy as a whole. Let t¯ i be the tax rate that taxpayer i
views as ethical, and let ¯il be i’s view of the ethical behaviour for taxpayers
l = 1, . . . , n. These are computed by i as the solution to a social welfare-
maximising problem in which i: (i) uses an additive social welfare function
with constant aversion to inequality ρ, (ii) puts the same weight on all
other individuals’ well-being as on her own, and (iii) sees through the
government budget constraint by recognising that the average tax liability
equals the demogrant. Taxpayer i’s ethical tax rate t¯ i and ethical labour
supplies ¯il , l = 1, . . . , n, solve the following problem:5
max
t,i1, ... ,
i
n
[
(1−t)wiii +e−h(ii )
]1−ρ
1−ρ +
∑
j =i
[
(1−t)w jij +e−h(ij )
]1−ρ
1−ρ , (3)
subject to the government budget constraint:
e = t
∑
k wk
i
k
n
. (4)
Note that the social welfare function used here could be interpreted as
a utilitarian one in which the term [(1 − t)w lil + e − h(il )]1−ρ/(1 − ρ) acts
as the individual utility function. It is a particular cardinalisation of the
household’s quasi-linear ordinal preferences. It is immediately apparent that,
if all taxpayers have the same ethical preference as we assume, the ethical
tax rate t¯ i and labour supplies il are identical for all individuals i = 1, . . . ,
n since they all solve the same problem.6 For this reason, we simply use
the notation t¯ for the ethical tax rate, and el as the ethical labour supply
for individual l ∈ {1, . . . , n} in what follows. Note that even if individuals
agree on el , ethical labour supplies generally vary across individuals: 
e
k =
el .
5 This approach is in contrast with Cervellati et al. (2004), who, in a different context
and with a different focus, assume that an individual’s preferences for redistribution are
established using a social welfare function with endogenous weights put on others, but with
an exogenously set level of “acceptable”—we would say ethical—labour supplies.
6 In a more general treatment, we might consider the case where individuals are only partially
ethical. One way to do this would be to assume that they put a lower weight, say β i < 1, on
the utility of others than on themselves. If individuals were to put a weight β i < 1 on others,
each would then face a different problem and il would typically differ for i = 1, . . . , n. In
order to make our arguments as simple as possible, we concentrate on the fully ethical case,
where β i = 1.
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After substituting constraint (4) into the objective function (3), we can 
write the first-order conditions on t¯  and l as follows:∑
j
{[
y¯ − w jej
][
θ j + t¯
(
y¯ − w jej
)]−ρ} = 0, (5)
[
(1 − t¯)wl + t¯ wl
n
− h′(el )
] [
θl + t¯
(
y¯ − wlel
)]−ρ
+
∑
j =l
{
t¯
wl
n
[
θ j + t¯
(
y¯ − w jej
)]−ρ} = 0 l = 1, . . . , n, (6)
where θ j ≡ wjej − h(ej ) is the utility in consumption units that household
j would get from earning the income associated with the ethical labour
supply ei , and y¯ ≡
∑
k wk
e
k/n is average ethical income. Equation (5)
characterises the tax rate perceived as ethical, while (6) characterises the
choice of labour supplies for all taxpayers l = 1, . . . , n that are viewed as
ethical.
Given t¯ , we can define the ethical tax liability of i, denoted T¯ i , as the
amount of tax she pays under t¯ when all individuals behave ethically: T¯ i =
t¯wiei − t¯ y¯. Since T¯ i is increasing in the wage rate w i, if the government’s
policy is purely redistributive, T¯ i < 0 for the lowest-wage households. Note
that in an economy with two wage rates, the ethical tax rate—the solution
to (5)—equalises utilities for the two types.7 This result that utilities are
equalised in our model regardless of the value of ρ is a useful one that
simplifies our exposition and analysis considerably. Because the tax system
has two instruments and there are two types of agents, the appropriate tax
rate and demogrant can replicate the lump-sum tax system. Consequently,
it is evident that the undistorted labour supply maximises social welfare.
On the other hand, in an economy with more than two wage rates, the
ethical tax rate does not generally equalise utilities among all households.
With a linear progressive income tax, there are not enough instruments to
replicate a lump-sum tax system, and utility will increase with the wage rate
in the second-best ethical optimum. In this case, labour supply can be used
to compensate for the lack of instruments in the tax system. For example,
the ethical labour supply for the lowest-wage taxpayer, say, i = 1, is charac-
terised by e1 = (1 − t¯)w1 + t¯w1/n − h′(e1) + t¯w1(n − 1)/n > 0, which is
less than the undistorted labour supply. In contrast, the highest-wage tax-
payer is expected to provide more than the undistorted labour supply. This
7 This contrasts with the well-known Mirrlees (1974) result that under utilitarianism (of which
the above can be interpreted), high-wage households will be worse off than low-wage ones
under first-best lump-sum transfers. This difference can be accounted for by the fact that
with quasi-linear preferences, leisure is not a normal good, which is required for the Mirrlees
result.
trade-off might seem surprising at first sight since utility functions are
separable between consumption and leisure, but recall that applying the so-
cial welfare function undoes such separability. Finally, since reducing the
labour supply below the undistorted one is used solely to increase the utility
of lower-wage taxpayers, all taxpayers are still expected to provide a labour
supply which is equal or higher to the egotistical case, since reducing it
further would only reduce utility.
We can now state our behavioural assumptions on the choice of labour
supply of taxpayer i facing some tax schedule (t, e). We assume that she
behaves ethically and supplies ei if her net tax liability when she supplies
ei does not exceed T¯ i , that is, if twi
e
i − e ≤ T¯ i . If twiei − e > T¯ i , she
adopts one of two possible behaviours: partial or full egoism depending on
which one leads to higher labour supply. Under partial egoism, she adjusts
i so that she pays exactly her ethical net tax liability T¯ i . In that case,
she supplies i (t, e) such that twi

i − e = T¯ i . Clearly, i (t , e) < ei , and as
t diverges from t¯, i (t, e) also diverges from 
e
i . The taxpayer turns to full
egoism when it is not possible to select i (t, e) such that she pays exactly
T¯ i while satisfying i (t, e) > i (t).
In this case, taxpayer i chooses i (t). Taxpayer i’s behaviour is sum-
marised as follows:
i =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
ei if twi
e
i − e ≤ T¯ i
i (t, e) = (T¯ i + e)/twi if twiei − e > T¯ i and i (t, e) > i (t)
i (t) if twi
e
i − e > T¯ i and i (t, e) ≤ i (t).
(7)
Note that the net tax liability of taxpayer i is exactly T¯ i when she supplies ei
or i (t, e), and that it differs from T¯ i when she supplies her fully egoistic
labour supply i (t). This analysis applies whether T¯ i ≷ 0. That is, for a
transfer recipient for whom T¯ i < 0, ethical labour supply ¯i will be supplied
whenever twi ¯i − e ≤ T¯ i , so that the transfer is larger in absolute terms
than that regarded as ethical. For the transfer recipient, reductions in t will
ultimately result in a move from ei to 

i (t, e) and then to i , whereas for
a taxpayer the opposite is the case.
The Case with Two Wage Types
We consider a simplified world with two types of taxpayer: n1 taxpayers
with wage rate w 1, and n2 = n − n1 with wage rate w 2, where w 2 > w 1.
Most of the qualitatively interesting results apply in this case. As mentioned,
the first best is attainable in the ethical optimum, so the ethical labour
supply is simply the undistorted one.
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Both wage types have the same optimal–ethical tax rate t¯  = t¯1 = t¯2 > 0, 
since all have the same objective function in (3). And, since utilities are
equalised for the two types, we know by (6) that ei = ¯i . Given these, we
immediately obtain from (5):
t¯ = θ2 − θ1
w2¯2 − w1¯1
= 1 − h(¯2) − h(¯1)
w2¯2 − w1¯1
, (8)
where recall that θi ≡ wi ¯i − h(¯i ) is income net of the disutility of labour
under ethical behaviour. Since t¯ > 0, this implies that θ 2 > θ 1. Thus, while
all taxpayers have the same utility under t¯ , their incomes net of the disutility
of labour differ: more productive individuals earn more.
Let t˜i be the tax rate at which a taxpayer i chooses to become fully
egoistic given that taxpayer j behaves ethically, that is, such that i (t˜i ) =
i (t˜i , e) given j supplies ¯ j . Then, taxpayer i’s choice of labour supply
depends on the level of the prevailing tax rate t relative to the optimal–
ethical tax rate t¯ and to t˜i , as well as on whether her net tax liability is
positive (net contributor) or negative (net recipient). In our analysis with
only two types, a taxpayer with a high wage w 2 is a net contributor to the
government budget while a taxpayer with a low wage w 1 is a net recipient
of government resources as long as t > 0. Given that, the following lemma
is apparent:
Lemma 1. The key tax rates are ordered as follows: t˜1 < t¯ < t˜2.
In the context of the current model, we define a behavioural equilibrium
as follows.
Definition. For a given t, a behavioural equilibrium is a pair of labour
supplies (1, 2) which simultaneously satisfy (7).
A behavioural equilibrium is the analogue of a Nash equilibrium ex-
cept that the players, instead of maximising an objective function, follow
the behavioural rule given in (7). Using Lemma 1, we can characterise
the behavioural equilibrium choices of 1 and 2 for various levels of
t. In characterising equilibrium behaviour, we take account of the fact
that the government budget constraint is satisfied so that the demogrant
e equals average tax revenue. Then, we abuse notation innocuously by sup-
pressing e from the i (·) function and simply write i (t) for the partially
egoistic labour supply given the prevailing tax rate t and the associated
transfer.
Proposition 1. Given Lemma 1, there exists a behavioural equilibrium
associated with each tax rate t in which labour supplies (1, 2) are as
11
follows:
{1(t), ¯2} for t ≤ t˜1;{
1(t), ¯2
}
for t˜1 < t < t¯, where 1(t) = [t¯/t]¯1 − [(t¯ − t)/t][w2¯2/w1];
{¯1, ¯2} for t = t¯ ;
{¯1, 2(t)} for t¯ < t < t˜2, where 2(t) = [t¯/t]¯2 − [(t¯ − t)/t][w1¯1/w2];
{¯1, 2(t)} for t˜2 ≤ t .
(9)
In words, taxpayer with wage w 2, who is a net contributor, behaves ethic-
ally for tax rates t below t¯ . As t increases above t¯ , she becomes egoistic, at
first partially to maintain a constant net tax liability, then fully for t ≥ t˜2 to
prevent it from growing too fast as in the standard model. Despite becom-
ing fully egoistic, the tax liability increases at t = t˜2. Eventually, for some
t > t˜2, the top of the Laffer curve is reached and the tax liability declines.
Conversely, a taxpayer with a low wage w 1 is a net recipient of government
resources. She behaves ethically as long as the prevailing tax rate is above t¯
and can finance what she views as a reasonable net transfer. When the tax
rate t decreases below t¯ , she initially becomes partially egoistic, ensuring
that she still obtains a constant net transfer from the government. Then, for
all tax rates t below t˜1, she behaves fully egoistically.
We depict the equilibrium pairs of labour supply in Figures 1a and 1b.
The solid lines represent the labour supplies under ethical behaviour, while
the dashed lines represent the standard egoistic labour supplies. The striking
difference between the two cases is that under ethical behaviour, labour
supplies display some stickiness. Moreover, labour supplies for the low-
wage (transfer-receiving) household are not even weakly monotonic in the
tax rate: for a range of tax rates, they are actually increasing.
In Figure 1c, we depict equilibrium net tax liabilities when there are an
equal number of taxpayers of each type. (Differences in n1 and n2 affect
the relative height of the curves, but not their shape.) The net tax liability
of a taxpayer of type 2 is the inverted image of that of a taxpayer of type 1.
Note that whatever the number of taxpayers, the curves always exhibit a flat
portion between t˜1 and t˜2. Also note that T 2 (T 1) is necessarily increasing
(decreasing) at the left of t˜1 and at the right of t˜2.
This behavioural equilibrium generates private indirect utility functions
(which can be found in the proof of Proposition 1 in the Appendix). Fig-
ures 2a and 2b represent the equilibrium levels of utility under ethical
behaviour (the solid line) and egoistic preferences (the dashed line). To
understand these figures, we need to know how utility changes with t in
both regimes.
Begin with the benchmark of egoistic utilities. Denote the level of utility
achieved by a type i individual when all individuals in the economy act
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Fig. 1a. Choice of taxpayer 1 Fig. 1b. Choice of taxpayer 2
egoistically as follows:
v Si (t)= (1−t)wii (t) + t[n1w11(t) + n2w22(t)]/n−h(i (t)), i =1,2.
(10)
Applying the envelope theorem to vS2(t) and v
S
1(t), we obtain:
v S2
′
(t) = −n1[w22(t) − w11(t)]/n + t[n1w1′1(t) + n2w2′2(t)]/n,
v S1
′
(t) = n2[w22(t) − w11(t)]/n + t[n1w1′1(t) + n2w2′2(t)]/n.
(11)
Therefore, an increase in t leads to an unambiguous decrease in welfare
for type 2’s. On the other hand, welfare of type 1’s will be increasing in t
only if n2 is sufficiently large and w 2 − w 1 is sufficiently large relative to
t. If the welfare of type 1’s is also decreasing in t, there is no conflict and
both types prefer a lower t. Consequently, we restrict ourselves to cases
where the tax rate is small enough so that v S
′
1 (t) > 0.
Consider now the impact of taxes on individuals’ welfare in an economy
with ethical behaviour. Obviously, when t = 0, ethical behaviour or egoistic
preferences yield the same results. Begin with the type 2’s. When 0 < t < t˜1,
the welfare of type 2’s is decreasing with the tax rate, because their labour
supply is unchanged, while type 1’s reduce their labour supply. In this range,
type 2’s get lower utility compared to the case of egoistic preferences. In
the range of tax rates such that t˜1 < t < t¯ , type 2’s choose ¯2, while labour
supply for type 1’s increases as t goes up, so they always receive a net total
transfer of T¯ 1. This implies that a type 2 individual pays the same net total
taxes in this range, as shown in Figure 1c. Given that labour supply stays
constant, her welfare does not change as t goes up. At t¯ , all individuals
are better off under ethical behaviour, so there exists a point between t˜1
and t¯ where the welfare of type 2’s is identical under ethical behaviour and
egoistic preferences. Then, for all tax rates between t¯ and t˜2, type 2’s pay
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Fig. 1c. Net tax liabilities for taxpayers 1 and 2
the same net total taxes, so the variation in welfare is given by:
v ′2(t) =
[
w2 − h′
(
2(t)
)]
2
′(t) < 0. (12)
Finally, v 2(t) is decreasing in t > t˜2 since type 2’s pay more tax and
work less. Note that for all tax rates above t¯ , type 2’s are better off under
ethical behaviour, since type 1’s provide more effort than their egoistic level.
Figure 2b depicts all these effects.
Figure 2a illustrates the equilibrium levels of utility for type 1’s as t
changes. As mentioned earlier, under egoistic preferences, the utility of
these individuals is monotonically increasing with the tax rate (until max-
imal tax revenues are reached). Under ethical behaviour, for tax rates less
than t˜1, the impact of a change in t on utility is given by:
v ′1(t) = n2[w22(t) − w11(t)]/n + tn1w1′1(t)/n. (13)
Thus, given our assumption above that vS1(t) is increasing in t, so is v 1(t)
by (10). Of more interest, utility is also increasing in the range of taxes
between t˜1 and t¯ . In this range, type 2’s increase their labour supply so
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Fig. 2b. Welfare of taxpayer 2
that their tax payment, and therefore the transfer received by type 1’s net
of tax, is constant. This implies that the change in welfare for type 1’s is
given by:
v ′1(t) = [w1 − h′
(
1(t)
)
]1
′(t) > 0. (14)
Intuitively, a type 1 individual receives the same transfer, but works more
(and gets paid more) as taxes increase over that range. Since labour supply
is less than ¯1, type 1’s end up better off by working more. Note that for
every tax rate t ≤ t¯ , type 1’s obtain a higher level of utility under ethical
preference because type 2’s provide the efficient labour supply ¯2. Then,
when the tax rate is higher than t¯ , but less than t˜2, the utility level of type
1’s is constant. They receive the same net transfer, because the type 2’s pay
the same net taxes, and they provide the same labour supply ¯1. Finally,
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for tax rates above t˜2,
v ′1(t) = n2[w22(t) − w1¯1]/n + tn2w2′2(t)/n, (15)
which may be increasing (Case A) or decreasing (Case B) in t at t˜2. The
reason is as follows. First, ∂v 1(t)/∂t contains the term [w22(t) − w1¯1],
while the same derivative for the egoistic preferences contains the term
[w22(t) − w11(t)]. Consequently, it is possible for the derivative of v 1(t)
with respect to the tax rate to be negative while its counterpart for the
egoistic preferences is positive. Intuitively, under ethical behaviour, type 1’s
provide higher labour supply for higher tax rates, so the loss of income
due to an increase in tax rate is higher. Since at t˜2, the utility of a type 1
individual is higher under egoistic preference (because behaving egoistically
is a best response to the egoistic behaviour of others), there exists a point
between t¯ and t˜2 where both types of preference yield the same level of
utility.
An interesting feature of the ethical preference environment is that a tax
rate of t¯ Pareto dominates any other tax rate between t˜1 and t˜2. However,
each type may be better off at tax rates outside that range. This is relevant
when considering tax rates that may be determined by voting, to which we
now turn.
III. Voting
Suppose majority voting determines t. A critical assumption is what pref-
erences are used when voting. Generally, the most preferred tax rates of
voters of wage types 1 and 2, anticipating the behavioural equilibrium, are
the solutions to the following problems:
max
t
v1(t) + β[(n1 − 1)v1(t) + n2v2(t)],
max
t
v2(t) + β[n1v1(t) + (n2 − 1)v2(t)], (16)
where β is the ethical weight put on others in society. We refer to the case
of β = 1—where households vote in accordance with the social welfare
benchmark given in (3)—as ethical voting. In this case, the voting outcome
is trivial: the most preferred outcome for all households would be t¯ . On
the other hand, individuals who vote egoistically will use β < 1. As Figure
2 indicates, private utilities are not necessarily maximised for either type
at the ethical tax rate t¯ : low-wage households might be better off for tax
rates t ≥ t˜2, while high-wage households would be better off for t ≤ t˜1.
Consequently, the tax policy preferred by egoistic voters will often conflict
with the ethical tax policy and will differ for the two types.
Why might individuals vote egoistically if they behave ethically? Because
avoidance activities are at least partially observable, social stigma and/or
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associated repercussions may be the underlying force of conformity with 
ethical behaviour. However, the secret ballot makes it difficult for voting 
behaviour to be influenced by such considerations. For this reason, we 
explore the case in which households vote at least in part according to 
their self-interest, even though once the tax rate is set, they may behave 
ethically. We first consider the fully egoistic voting case in which β = 0, 
and then discuss briefly the partially ethical case (0 < β  < 1).
With β = 0, private preferences of both types will be single-peaked in the 
tax rate under reasonable assumptions, so the median voter’s most-preferred 
outcome will constitute a voting equilibrium. We assume in what follows 
that n1 > n2, so that the median voter is low wage. This implies that we 
need only investigate the voting preferences of type 1 households. The case 
with n2 > n1 is far less interesting since the utility of the individuals of type 
2 is decreasing with the tax rate, implying that their most preferred tax rate 
is simply zero.
Under egoistic voting, type 1 voters prefer a tax rate that weakly exceeds 
the ethical tax rate t¯ . However, their preferred tax rate may either exceed or 
fall below t˜2. To distinguish these cases, we denote type 1’s preferred tax 
rate as t1
A when it exceeds t˜2 and t1
B when it is less than t˜2: thus, t1
A ∈ [t˜2, 1[ 
and t1
B ∈ [t¯, t˜2]. Consider the optimal tax rates for each of these cases in 
turn.
For t > t˜2, type 2’s behave egoistically, while type 1’s supply the ethical 
amount of labour. Utility for a type 1 can be written:
v1(t) = (1 − t)w1¯1 + e(t) − h(¯1)
= (1 − t)w1¯1 + t[α1w1¯1 + α2w22(t)] − h(¯1), (17)
with v ′1(t) = −w1¯1 + [α1w1¯1 + α2w22(t)] + tα2w2′2(t) and v ′′1 (t) =
2α2w2
′
2(t) + t′′2(t), where α i = ni/n is the share of type i’s in the econ-
omy. Since ′2(t) < 0, then v
′′
1 (t) < 0 if 
′′
2(t) < 0, which is not guaranteed.
Nonetheless, it is reasonable to suppose that v ′′1 (t) < 0, in which case pref-
erences are single-peaked.8 If type 1’s preferred tax rate is above t˜2, it will
satisfy the first-order condition v ′(t A1 ) = 0, or:
−(1 − α1)w1¯1 + α2w22
(
t A1
) + t A1 α2w2′2(t A1 ) = 0. (18)
Now suppose t ∈ [t¯, t˜2]. Let T i (t) = twii (t) − (t/n)[n1w 11(t)+
n2w 22(t)] be the net tax liability of an individual of type i. The gov-
ernment budget constraint can be written as n1T 1(t) + n2T 2(t) = 0. From
Figure 1c we know that for t ∈ [t¯, t˜2], all individuals of type 2 supply
8 In fact, single-peakedness is not necessary for a median-voter equilibrium. As Gans and
Smart (1996) show, there will be a Condorcet winner in voting over linear progressive tax
schedules if preferences satisfy a single-crossing property in consumption–income space,
which holds here.
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2(t) so that T 2(t) remains constant: T
′
2(t) = 0. This and the government
budget constraint implies that T 1(t) also remains constant: T ′1(t) = 0. The
choice of t ∈ [t¯, t˜2] by a type 1 person satisfies:
max
t
w1¯1 − T1(t) − h(¯1). (19)
Since T ′1(t) = 0, type 1’s are indifferent among tax rates in this region.
Whether type 1’s preferred tax rate lies above or below t˜2 depends on the
parameters of the problem. In Figure 2a, Case A, since v 1(t) is increasing
in t at t˜2, individuals of type 1 are better off at a tax rate tA1 above t˜2
satisfying (17). On the contrary, in Figure 2a, Case B, v 1(t) is decreasing
in t at t˜2 so that any tax rate t B1 ∈ [t¯, t˜2] dominates tax rates larger than
t˜2. Using (17), v 1(t A1 ) > v 1(t
B
1 ) if w2[t
A
1 2(t
A
1 ) − t B1 2(t B1 )] > (t A1 − t B1 )w1¯1.
The LHS is the extra revenue collected from the individuals of type 2 from
imposing the higher tax t A1 rather than t
B
1 . The RHS is the loss in welfare to
the individuals of type 1 from their higher tax liabilities. Thus, if type 1’s
can extract high enough additional revenue to compensate for their own
higher tax liabilities, they will prefer to do so, as is the case in Figure 2a,
Case A.
Next, let us compare the preferred tax rate of a type 1 voting egoistically
when behaviour is ethical (as given by (7)) with that under pure egoistic
behaviour. The latter, denoted tE1 , is the tax rate that max-
imises v1(t) = (1 − t)w11(t) + e(t) − h(1(t)), where ne(t) = t[n1w11(t) +
n2w22(t)]. The preferred tax rate t
E
1 satisfies the first-order condition:
n2
[
w22
(
t E1
) − w11(t E1 )] + t E1 [n1w1′1(t E1 ) + n2w2′2(t E1 )] = 0. (20)
When behaviour is ethical and tA1 is the voting outcome, the first-order
condition (18) applies. To determine whether t A1 ≷ t
E
1 , we can evaluate the
LHS of (18) at tE1 to obtain:
t A1 ≷ t
E
1 ⇐⇒ n2
[
w22
(
t E1
) − w1¯1] + t E1 n2w2′2(t E1 )≷ 0. (21)
Combining this with first-order condition (20) for tE1 and simplifying, we
obtain:
t A1 ≷ t
E
1 ⇐⇒ 
(
t E1
) − t E1 ′1(t E1 )≷ ¯1 or t A1 ≷ t E1 ⇐⇒ 1 + t
E
1
1 − t E1
ε≷
¯1
1
,
(22)
where ε is the elasticity of egoistic labour supply. Thus, if the elasticity of
labour supply is high enough, the tax rate chosen under egoistic voting when
behaviour is ethical will be higher than that when it is purely egoistic, as
in Figure 2a, Case A. The intuition is that a higher labour supply elasticity
magnifies the deadweight loss associated with pure egoistic behaviour.
To summarise, for the case where the voters of wage type 1 are the ma-
jority, for egoistic voting (β = 0), the voting equilibrium is established at
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t1
A > t¯  in Case A, or t1
B = t¯  in Case B. With ethical voting (β = 1), the voting 
equilibrium tax rate is t¯ . It is then possible to show that with partially ethical
voting (0 < β  < 1), the voting equilibrium tax rate must be some t ∈ [t¯, t1A]. 
When the voters of wage type 2 are the majority, the equilibrium tax rate 
under egoistic voting is 0 while that under fully ethical voting is t¯ . In the 
case of partially ethical voting (0 < β  < 1), the voting equilibrium tax rate 
must then be some t ∈ [0, t¯]. It follows that when voting becomes more ego-
istic (i.e., when β decreases), voting becomes more polarised and the voting 
outcome is more extreme, i.e., the equilibrium tax rate t is closer to 0 or
t1
A. On the other hand, when voting becomes more ethical (i.e., when β 
increases), voting becomes less polarised and the result of the voting 
equilibrium is more consensual, the equilibrium tax rate t converging 
to t¯ .
IV. Altruism
Under ethical behaviour, individuals effectively act against their own self-
interest when they choose to supply labour ethically. In contrast, preferences 
might be modelled so that behaving socially is in one’s own interest. A 
common approach in the case of redistribution and bequests is to as-
sume that households are motivated by altruism; see Hochman and Rodgers 
(1969) and Barro (1974). We now consider the case where altruism influ-
ences labour supply (variations in which are the only way of satisfying the 
altruistic urge). With altruistic preferences, individuals will react to changes 
in other individuals’ welfare in a symmetric fashion: if you are better off, 
I will want to contribute less, and vice versa. The key feature is that my 
action does not depend on your action per se, but on your level of welfare. 
That you are better off because your wage increased, or because you chose 
to work less, is unimportant. With ethical preferences, such a distinction 
is relevant. Once the appropriate overall redistribution target is determined, 
an agent is not willing to contribute more. However, if an economy-wide 
parameter changes, the redistribution target may change. This distinction 
leads to different predictions about behaviour.
Individuals now maximise utility including an altruistic component. In 
particular, the labour supply of a type i satisfies:
max
i
[(1 − t)wii + e − h(i )]1−ρ
1 − ρ
+ βi
∑
j =i
[(1 − t)w j j + e − h( j )]1−ρ
1 − ρ s.t. e =
t
n
∑
i
wii , (23)
where β i is the degree of altruism of individual i. This assumes that indi-
viduals see through the government budget constraint when making their
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choices. If not, they will not realise that changing their labour supply
affects others’ well-being, so they will behave egoistically. The first-order
condition for agent i is given by:
wi (1 − t) − h′(i ) = − t
n
wi
{
1 + βi
∑
j =i
[
(1 − t)wii + e − h(i )
(1 − t)w j j + e − h( j )
]ρ}
.
(24)
Let us focus on the case in which β i = 1, a case which resembles
that with ethical behaviour studied above. Moreover, to facilitate compar-
ison with the case of ethical behaviour, we assume there are two wage
types with w 2 > w 1 with populations n1 and n2 as before. In this case,
utilities can be equalised using a linear progressive tax, in which case (24)
becomes:
wi (1 − t) − h′(i ) = −twi [1 + (n − 1)]/n, i = 1, 2, (25)
which implies that w i = h′(i ), and that i = ¯i , which is the ethical labour
supply. Therefore, this outcome would correspond with the case of ethical
behaviour when there are two wage types and t = t¯ . Therefore, at t¯ both
pure altruism and our assumed ethical behaviour yield the same result that
both households act as if the tax were lump-sum: neither exploits the tax
distortion for their own egoistic advantage.
Suppose now that t differs from t¯ . To simplify the notation, let ψ be
defined as follows:
ψ =
[
(1 − t)w11 + e − h(1)
(1 − t)w22 + e − h(2)
]ρ
. (26)
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Using this, the first-order conditions (24) in equilibrium become:
w1(1 − t) − h′(1) = −tw1[1 + (n1 − 1) + n2ψ]/n, (27)
w2(1 − t) − h′(2) = −tw2[1 + (n2 − 1) + n1/ψ]/n. (28)
When t < t¯ , the type 1’s have a lower level of utility than type 2’s, so ψ < 1.
Then,
w1(1 − t) − h′(1) = −tw1[n1 + n2ψ]/n > − tw1[n1 + n2]/n, (29)
so type 1 households’ labour supply is less than ¯1. On the other hand, the
first-order condition for individuals of type 2 reveals that:
w2(1−t)−h′(2)=−tw2[1+(n2−1)+n1/ψ]/n <−tw2[n1+n2]/n, (30)
so individuals of type 2 supply more than ¯2. With altruistic preference,
there are no limits to how much households will compensate for the im-
perfection in the tax system. The same analysis can be undertaken for tax
rates above t¯ . Figures 3a and 3b show the labour supplies for the two types
under altruistic and egoistic preferences.
The contrast with respect to both egoistic and ethical labour supplies
is striking, especially for the low-wage households. For low-wage altruistic
households, labour supplies are monotonically increasing in the tax rate, the
mirror image of the egoistic case. For the high-wage types, the labour supply
is decreasing in t, but is everywhere higher under altruistic preferences than
under egoistic ones. Labour supplies in the ethical case are intermediate to
the other two, and are characterised by inelastic ranges that are unique to
the ethical case.
V. Conclusion
As we showed in the preceding section, the pattern of labour supply choices
is very different when we compare the more standard altruistic model with
our proposed ethical behaviour. One important reason for such differences
comes from the asymmetry we introduced in our behavioural assumptions.
When individuals are asked to pay more in taxes than what they believe
to be ethical, they respond by avoiding taxes to prevent their tax liabilities
from exceeding their ethical ones. However, when they are asked to pay
less than what they believe to be ethical, they do not provide more than
the ethical labour supply to redistribute to others, as in the altruistic case.
Others have made equivalent asymmetric assumptions. In Bordignon (1990),
agents choose between evading taxes or not, and tax evasion only occurs
if taxes are viewed as being unfairly high. There is no attempt to pay
more taxes when liabilities are viewed as being lower than fair levels.
Bilodeau and Gravel (2004) make the same type of asymmetric assumption
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in dealing with voluntary contributions to public goods. Even if this form of
asymmetric treatment were to be relaxed, altruistic and ethical behaviours
would still generate some different predictions. To see this, note that for
every tax rate between t˜1 and t˜2 the total tax liability for both agents remains
constant. For example, if the tax rate were to slightly increase above t¯ , the
high-wage agent would reduce her labour supply to avoid paying taxes
above what she believes to be ethical. The low-wage agent would then
face the same tax burden, and consequently would still choose the same
labour supply. It is only when the tax rate is raised above t˜2 that symmetric
treatment would make a difference. It is not obvious what would be the
consequence of relaxing this assumption for a tax rate outside of the range
[t˜1, t˜2], but we are confident that our result would hold for a tax rate in
between.
If ethical behaviour can be applied to income tax, it can also be applied
to other forms of taxation, like consumption taxes. If an individual is aware
that the payment of consumption taxes provides social benefits by allowing
the government to make transfers or provide public goods, this individual
can compute what would be an ethical tax burden using a social welfare
function. From there, the behaviour of this individual would be similar to
that described here. As the tax on a good rises, an individual may not alter
her consumption until the tax burden becomes large enough, and so on.
However, the important aspect is that the individual realised that the tax
paid provides social benefit. Consequently, some form of taxation may be
more prone to the formation of ethical behaviour.
Among the potential extensions to this paper, the most obvious would be
to consider more than two types of individuals. With more than two types,
utilities will not be equalised among all agents in an optimum. Neverthe-
less, this would not change our results significantly provided individuals
recognise the limits of the tax system when assessing their ethical tax bur-
den. All individuals would agree on the ethical tax rate t¯ , which would still
maximise the same social welfare function. The rest of individuals’ choices
would be made in the same fashion.
A final, but conceptually difficult, extension would be to introduce het-
erogeneity among agents in terms of ethics. This would amount to find-
ing out whether there can be more that one ethical tax rate. An easy
approach would be to assume that when assessing their ethical tax rate,
each individual maximises a social welfare function that puts a weight
β < 1 on others. As a consequence, different individuals would have dif-
ferent t¯’s. This would make it unlikely that the first-best outcome can
be reached in equilibrium. Intuitively, if the poor believe they are enti-
tled to more than what the rich view as fair to pay, they will choose to
avoid more. This, in turn, will put pressure on the tax burden of the rich,
and will induce them to avoid more. This approach implies that multiple
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visions of what ethical behaviour is, or should be, may coexist in the same 
society.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
The partially ethical labour supply is i
(t, e) = ( ¯tw i ¯i − t¯ y¯ + e)/tw i . The cut-off tax 
rate t˜i is defined as the point where i
(t˜i , e) = i (t˜i ). If we replace e by its equilibrium 
value, we get that t˜i is given by
t˜i
[
wii (t˜i ) −
ni wii (t˜i ) + n j w j j (t˜i )
n
]
= t¯
[
wi ¯i − ni wi ¯i + n j w j ¯ j
n
]
, (A1)
where  j (t˜i ) = ¯ j (by definition of t˜i ). Equation (A1) describing t˜i can be rewritten as:
t˜i [wii (t˜i ) − w j ¯ j ] = t¯[wi ¯i − w j ¯ j ]. (A2)
Consider first the determination of t˜1. From equation (A2), t˜1 is given by
t˜1 = t¯
[
w2¯2 − w1¯1
w2¯2 − w11(t˜1)
]
. (A3)
That t˜1 < t¯ follows from the fact that w1¯1 > w11(t˜1), which in turn implies that
w2¯2 − w1¯1 < w2¯2 − w11(t˜1).
An analogous condition exists for t˜2 which implies that t˜2 > t¯ . 
Proof of Proposition 1
We solve for the behavioural equilibrium labour supplies for all possible tax rates.
Consider first the case of t = t¯ . The net tax payment for both types when they supply
¯i is given by t¯wi ¯i − (t¯/n)[n1w1¯1 + n2w2¯2]. Recall from equation (7) that all agents
facing such tax liabilities provide ¯i .
Consider now the effect of reducing t on the equilibrium labour supplies, starting
from t¯ . The tax liability of an individual of type 2 when she chooses ¯2 is given
by t(n1/n)[w2¯2 − w11(t)]. Consequently, a decrease in the tax rate reduces her tax
liability. This implies that for all tax rates below t¯ , individuals of type 2 continue to
provide ¯2. This in turn implies that for all t ∈ [t˜1, t¯], an individual of type 1 chooses
her labour supply as follows:
1(t) =
[
t¯
t
]
¯1 −
[
t¯ − t
t
]
w2¯2
w1
. (A4)
When the tax t reaches t˜1, then 1(t˜1) = 1(t˜1) and so, for all tax rates lower than t˜1,
individuals of type 1 supply 1(t).
For tax rates above t¯ , it is now individuals of type 1 who supply labour ethic-
ally, ¯1 in their case. To see this, note that the net benefit of these individuals,
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i.e., t(n2/n)[w22(t) − w1¯1], is non-decreasing in the tax rate t unless:
∂2(t)
∂t
> − [w22(t) − w1¯1]
tw2
. (A5)
In other words, the net benefit of the type 1 is non-decreasing in t provided the type
2 individuals are not too reactive. Assuming this, individuals of type 1 provide ¯1
for all tax rates above t˜1. For all t ∈ [t¯, t˜2], individuals of type 2 supply labour such
that:
2(t) =
[
t¯
t
]
¯2 −
[
t¯ − t
t
]
w1¯1
w2
. (A6)
When t reaches t˜2, then 2(t˜2) = 2(t˜2). For all tax rates above t˜2, individuals of
type 2 supply 2(t). Given behaviour of the two types of taxpayers in the behavioural
equilibrium and their net tax liabilities, it is possible to write their indirect utility in
terms of consumption as a function of the prevailing tax rate t, denoted v i(t). We
have:
v1(t) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(1 − t)w11(t) + (t/n)[n1w11(t) + n2w2¯2] − h(1(t)) if t ≤ t˜1
(1 − t)w11(t) + (t/n)[n1w11(t) + n2w2¯2] − h(1(t)) if t˜1 < t < t¯
(1 − t¯)w1¯1 + (t¯/n)[n1w1¯1 + n2w2¯2] − h(¯1) if t = t¯
(1 − t)w1¯1 + (t/n)[n1w1¯1 + n2w22(t)] − h(¯1) if t¯ < t < t˜2
(1 − t)w1¯1 + (t/n)[n1w1¯1 + n2w22(t)] − h(¯1) if t˜2 ≤ t
v2(t) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(1 − t)w2¯2 + (t/n)[n1w11(t) + n2w2¯2] − h(¯2) if t ≤ t˜1
(1 − t)w2¯2 + (t/n)[n1w11(t) + n2w2¯2] − h(¯2) if t˜1 < t < t¯
(1 − t¯)w2¯2 + (t¯/n)[n1w1¯1 + n2w2¯2] − h(¯2) if t = t¯
(1 − t)w22(t) + (t/n)[n1w1¯1 + n2w22(t)] − h(2(t)) if t¯ < t < t˜2
(1 − t)w22(t) + (t/n)[n1w1¯1 + n2w22(t)] − h(2(t)) if t˜2 ≤ t .

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